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Why Buy That Theory?

Roald Hoffmann

Frameworks for Understanding

Stephen G. Brush has recently studied a range of fields and discoveries, to see what role predictions play in the acceptance of theories. Here's what he has to say about the new quantum mechanics: "Novel predictions played essentially no role in the acceptance of the most important physical theory of the 20th century, quantum mechanics. Physicists quickly accepted that theory because it provided a coherent deductive account of a large body of known empirical facts.?" Many theories predict relatively little (quantum mechanics actually did eventually) yet are accepted because they carry tremendous explanatory power. They do so by classification, providing a framework (for the mind) for ordering an immense amount of observation. This is what I think 20th century theories of acidity and basicity in chemistry (à la Lewis or Brønsted) do. Alternatively, the understanding provided is one of mechanism—this is the strength of the theory of evolution.

It is best to distinguish the concepts of theory, explanation and understanding. Or to try to do so, for they resist differentiation. Evelyn Fox Keller, who in her brilliant recent book, Making Sense of Life, has many instructive tales of theory acceptance, says this of explanation:

A description or a phenomenon counts as an explanation ? if and only if it meets the needs of an individual or a community. The challenge, therefore, is to understand the needs that different kinds of explanations meet. Needs do of course vary, and inevitably so: they vary not only with the state of the science at a particular time, with local technological, social, and economic opportunities, but also with larger cultural preoccupations.

As Bas van Fraassen has incisively argued, any explanation is an answer. If we accept that, the nature of the question becomes of essence, and so does our reception of the answer. Both (the reconstructed question of "why?" and our response) are context-dependent and subjective. Understanding, van Fraassen says, "consists in being in a position to explain." And so is equally subjective in a pragmatic universe.

Incidentally, explanations are almost always stories. Indeed, moralistic and deterministic stories. For to be satisfying they don't just say A-->B-->C-->D, but A-->B-->C-->D because of such and such propensities of A, B and C. The implicit strong conviction of causality, justified by seemingly irrefutable reason, may be dangerously intoxicating. This is one reason why I wouldn't like scientists and engineers to run this world.

The acceptance of theories depends as much on the psychology of human beings as on the content of the theories. It is human beings who decide, individually and as a community, whether a theory indeed has explanatory power or provides understanding. This is why seemingly "extrascientific" factors such as productivity, portability, storytelling power and aesthetics matter. Sometimes it takes a long time (witness continental drift), but often the acceptance is immediate and intuitive—it fits. Like a nice sweater.

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