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COMPUTING SCIENCE

Connecting the Dots

Can the tools of graph theory and social-network studies unravel the next big plot?

Brian Hayes

Inner Circles and Outer Rings

The social networks described above were constructed retrospectively. The starting point was a complete list of the known members of the group, along with enough biographical information to fill in the links. Discerning the same structure in advance—when an attack is still in the planning stage and most of the plotters are unknown—would be much harder, especially when working from impersonal data such as logs of phone calls or e-mails.

Sketching out such networks surely falls within the NSA's mandate, which might explain the agency's interest in the call graph. One scenario is easy to imagine. Someone has come under suspicion, based on information from other sources, and by consulting the call graph the NSA learns whom that person has been talking with in recent weeks or months. The result is a "ring" of contacts surrounding the subject. Then each of the contacts is investigated in the same way, producing a second ring of contacts-of-contacts. This process could be continued further, although the exponential growth of the graph will soon take in most of the population (especially if the subject has answered a call from a telemarketer or has ordered a pizza). Of more interest are instances where the subject's contacts are also contacts of one another, since such triangular links suggest strong ties.

The tricky part of this network analysis is not finding the links but knowing which of them are significant. It may well be true that if intelligence agencies had "connected the dots," all of the September 11 hijackers could have been linked to the two who were spotted in January of 2000. But thousands of other people would have been linked to those individuals as well. Showing the network of conspirators in isolation is misleading; the graph is actually embedded in a vastly larger structure.

Direct access to the call graph would be a convenience in tracing the associations of known suspects, but it is not necessary. For any named individual, the same records could be obtained under court order, as they are by law-enforcement agencies during criminal investigations. Indeed, if the call graph is used only for such purposes, it seems like quite an extravagance—sifting through 1012 records for the few hundred or few thousand calls that might be of interest.

But news reports hint at a more ambitious function for the call graph: not merely tracking down the associates of a known malefactor but rather discovering a plot without any prior guidance, merely by searching the archive for "patterns that might point to suspects." This sounds like magic: You cast your gaze over the vast and intricate web of the call graph, and without even knowing the names behind the phone numbers, you perceive some pattern of linkages that's a danger sign. Can this trick be transferred from the world of magic to the world of algorithms?

If such a signature pattern exists, the findings of social-network theory suggest it should involve some distinctive combination of strong and weak ties. A terrorist cell, seen from the point of view of telephone traffic, might be a set of people who talk among themselves a lot but have little to say to the rest of the world. Thus the pattern that rings the alarm bells would be a dense subgraph in comparative isolation from its surroundings.




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