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HOME > PAST ISSUE > July-August 2004 > Article Detail

FEATURE ARTICLE

Mad-Cow Disease in Cattle and Human Beings

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy provides a case study in how to manage risks while still learning the facts

Paul Brown

BSE in North America

Were it not for the international trade in cattle and cattle feed, BSE would probably have been confined to Great Britain. But cattle and feed continued to be exported from Britain to countries all over the globe for several years—throughout the late 1980s and early '90s—after the cause of BSE had been identified. From the mid-1990s onwards, cases of the disease began to appear in Europe and in countries as far afield as Oman and Japan.

Figure 8. Export of live cattle . . .Click to Enlarge Image

Ironically, the discovery of BSE in the United States at the end of 2003 recapitulated what had occurred with scrapie nearly 60 years before, when infected sheep were imported from Canada, which had earlier imported infected sheep from Great Britain. This time, at least one BSE-infected cow (and probably more) was imported to Canada from Great Britain during the high-risk 1980s. At some point these cows were probably rendered into feed that infected some "next generation" cows. The BSE cow that was discovered in Washington state in December 2003 had been imported to the U.S. in September 2001 from the same province of Canada (Alberta) in which the Canadian BSE cow had earlier been identified. Both cows were born in 1997, just before the ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban was implemented, and it is now a matter of record that some leftover feed continued to be used to supplement the diets of newborn calves.

When the two cows were slaughtered in 2003, neither was suspected of having BSE, so their carcasses were sent to rendering plants for use in feed supplements. The cows were only discovered to have BSE when their brains were later tested as part of a routine surveillance program of "downer" (nonambulatory or disabled) cows, and beef products from the cow in Washington state had already entered the human food supply.

Figure 9. Slaughterhouse practices . . .Click to Enlarge Image

Regulatory agencies in Canada and the U.S., primed by the mad-cow scare in Great Britain and continental Europe, reacted quickly in response to the discovery of the infected cows. All living cows that could be traced from both farms, as well as products made from their tissues, were destroyed. A host of new regulations were also either implemented or proposed, of which the most important were these: prohibition of tissues known to be infectious in BSE cows (cranium, vertebral column, distal ileum, lymphoreticular tissues) for use by either animals or human beings; elimination of mechanically recovered meat unless it could be shown by sensitive immunologic tests to be free of nervous tissue; initiation of a much-increased BSE immunological testing program for downer cows (which are henceforth not to be used for food or other products for either animals or human beings); and a "beefed-up" program of onsite inspections of rendering plants, feed mills and slaughterhouses. Along with a strictly enforced ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban, these measures should prevent the future spread of BSE to other animals and human beings—even if the disease is eventually found to occur as a rare spontaneous event.

Given the absence of indigenously infected cattle and the expanded BSE testing program, the U.S. has both the motivation and resources to answer, once and for all, the vexing question of whether or not BSE occurs spontaneously. If it occurs at the same rate as sporadic CJD in human beings (one case per million per year), several years of testing hundreds of thousands of cattle will be required to obtain a statistically significant result. Because other equally motivated countries are disqualified by the occurrence of cattle with foodborne BSE, only in the U.S. do we still have this unique, one-time only opportunity to confirm or refute the thesis that the BSE outbreak could have resulted from a spontaneous occurrence.

Figure 10. Probability of detecting . . .Click to Enlarge Image

When BSE and its human counterpart, vCJD, pass into history—which they undoubtedly will—some may believe that a quarter century of scientific knowledge was gained at the expense of veterinary and public health. This would be neither fair nor accurate. Great Britain and indeed the world owe an immense debt of gratitude to the few key investigators who correctly identified the basic issues with extraordinary rapidity. The problem was in translating the evolving scientific knowledge into government policy, because until public concern forces the issue, governments are almost always loathe to take a proactive stance in the face of purely hypothetical risks. This is due in great measure to the fact that regulations designed to protect public health from imagined dangers invariably cause real damage to the commercial sectors involved, and unless the data are undeniable, these interests will understandably argue against restrictive measures. It is thus not at all clear that any so-called "lessons" will inform future situations, because risk-benefit analyses that are based on incomplete knowledge depend on both scientific and political considerations and will continue to frustrate scientists and policy makers alike.

Bibliography

  • Brown, P. 2003. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy as a Zoonotic Disease. ILSI Europe Report Series. Brussels: International Life Sciences Institute.
  • Brown, P., and R. Bradley. 1998. 1755 and all that: A historical primer of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. British Medical Journal 317:1688–1692.
  • Brown, P., R. G. Will, R. Bradley, D. L. Asher and L. Detwiler. 2001. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: Background, evolution, and current concerns. Emerging Infectious Diseases 7:6–16.
  • Hadlow, W. J., R. C. Kennedy and R. E. Race. 1982. Natural infection of Suffolk sheep with scrapie virus. Journal of Infectious Diseases 146:657–664.
  • Prusiner, S. B. 2001. Shattuck Lecture—Neuro-degenerative diseases and prions. New England Journal of Medicine 334:1516–1526.
  • Stevenson, M. A., et al. 2000. Temporal aspects of the epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Great Britain: Individual animal-associated risk factors for the disease. Veterinary Record 147:349–354.
  • Taylor, D. M., S. L. Woodgate, A. J. Fleetwood and R. J. G. Cawthorne. 1997. Effect of rendering procedures on the scrapie agent. Veterinary Record 141:643–649.
  • Wells, G. A. H., et al. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy in cattle. Veterinary Record 121:419–420.
  • Will, R. G., et al. 1996. A new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet 347:921–925.




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